Welcome and Safety Briefing

Fakir Mohammed – IMT – Regional Champion
Safety Brief and Arrangements
Welcome and Introduction

Rob Drysdale – Director (OCIMF)
OCIMF Milestones

Key Events in the History of OCIMF

1956/57 and 1967/75: Suez Canal Closed
1967: Grounding of Torrey Canyon
1970: OCIMF was formed
1970: April 8
1971: Consultative status at IMO
1975: First OCIMF guideline published
1977: London branch office established
1978: ISGOTT published
1993: SIRE Programme Launched
2000: SIRE Inspector Training and Accreditation
2004: TMSA Programme Launched
2010: OVID Programme Launched
2013: MTIS Programme Launched
2016: Pilot for Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre – Gulf of Guinea (MTISC-GoG) ends
In fulfilling its mission, OCIMF will:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engage</th>
<th>Promote</th>
<th>Advocate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Identify and seek to resolve Safety, Security and Environmental issues affecting the industry through engagement with OCIMF Members and external stakeholders.</td>
<td>• Develop and publish Guidance, Recommendations and Best Practice by harnessing the skills and experience of members &amp; the wider industry.</td>
<td>• Contribute to the development, and encourage the ratification and implementation of international conventions and regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide tools and facilitate exchange of information, to promote continuous improvement in safe &amp; environmentally sustainable operations.</td>
<td>• Influence industry adoption of OCIMF guidance, recommendations &amp; best practice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Engage with OCIMF and non OCIMF members

• Encourage industry to utilize and be aware of the work of OCIMF

• Learn from one another

• Review regional challenges
Critical Success Factors

• Actively participate

• Make sure your voice is heard and your points communicated

• Ask Questions

• Network
Antitrust/Competition Law Guidance - DO NOT

Discuss the following topics:
• Prices/Freight Rates, Production, Capacity or inventions
• Sales/purchases, Costs, Future business plans
• Matters relating to individual customers/suppliers
• Employee compensation, benefits, remuneration etc.

Make any agreement on, or take a decision to conduct the following activities:
• Fix Sale or purchase prices
• Fix other terms of sale or purchase
• Restrict capacity or output
• Refrain from supplying a product or service
• Limit quality competition or research
• Divide Markets or customers
• Exclude competing companies from a market
• Blacklist or boycott customers or suppliers
Limit meeting discussions to agenda topics. Items for any other business should be discussed with the meeting Chairman beforehand.

Object if an improper or questionable subject is raised and ensure your objection is recorded in the minutes.

Seek Advice from OCIMF General Counsel and OCIMF Legal Committee before participating in the following potentially sensitive activities:

- Gathering and exchanging statistical information
- Benchmarking
- Creating Industry Standards
- Self-policing regulations
- OCIMF sponsored research
- Consult with OCIMF General Counsel and OCIMF Legal Committee on all questions which might be related to anti-trust/competition law
Formalities & Agenda

Rob Drysdale – Director
Step 1 – select “Imperial Hotel”

Step 2 – login password – imperial

Step 3 – select “other guests”

Step 4 – enter password - “ocimf2018jun”

NB check terms and conditions then tick Enter – “Connect”
How to join your event

1. Open a browser on any laptop, tablet or smartphone
2. Go to slido.com
3. Enter the event code #APRMF1

Tip: Try sending a few questions to see how it works in action.
Meeting Practicalities

Business Cards

Sign Attendance Sheet

Cell Phones - Respectful

Group Photo
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:15-10:00</td>
<td>MEG and the IMO</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00-10:20</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:20-13:00</td>
<td>OCIMF Programmes – SIRE &amp; OVID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-14:30</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30-16:00</td>
<td>Best Practice &amp; Lessons Learned</td>
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<tr>
<td>16:00-16:20</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>16:20-17:00</td>
<td>OCIMF Updates</td>
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Mooring Equipment Guidelines (MEG) publication update

Tony Wynne – Technical Adviser (Nautical)
Mooring Equipment Guidelines (MEG4)
Fourth Edition 2018
Mooring Equipment Guidelines - MEG3 published 2008

01/2015 – commenced initial work for revision of document to MEG 4 (changes in Rope technology - but considered light touch only)

03/2015 – ZARGA incident – HMSF line parted during mooring leading to serious injury.

07/2015 Initial findings ZARGA investigation

10/2015 MEG4 scope of work change to major revision agreed.

02/2016 Kick off meeting with members and Industry representatives.
Snapback Zone
A finite element model of the vessel geometry and quayside was built to assess the dynamic trajectory of the parted rope.
Rope Trajectory
Complex Snap-back
Multiple Roller Fairlead

a deg: AS PER MOORING LAYOUT
(MAX. 90 deg)
Approximate velocity of line whipping round fairlead rollers is ~200m/s
Mass of line is 1.133kg/m. Kinetic energy of line is approximately 23kJ/m
Fit for Purpose Lines

Mooring Line:
  MBL = 137 tonnes **failed at 24 tonnes**
  Life expectancy = 8 years **failed at 5 years**

Source:
[https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/56b8c217e5274a036900013/MAIBSafetyBulletin_1-2016.pdf](https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/56b8c217e5274a036900013/MAIBSafetyBulletin_1-2016.pdf)
Human Factors

Winch Operator

3/O Signal Relay

3/O OIC

Fairlead

Roller

Rope Parting Point

Rope
Mooring Equipment Guidelines (MEG4)

Recognition

- Wide variety of industry bodies and SMEs involved -
- Rope manufacturers associations; Classification societies; Ship operator associations; Ship building associations, Terminal design association; Equipment Manufacturers; Human Factors expertise ....
- Working Groups – Main WG; HMSF; WCDC; HF
Chapters

1 – Introduction to Mooring

2 – Human Factors

3 – Mooring Forces & Environmental Criteria

4 – Mooring Arrangements and Layouts

5 – Mooring Lines

6 – Mooring Winches

7 – Mooring and Towing Fittings

8 – Structural Reinforcements

9 – Berth Design and Fittings

10 – Ship/Shore Interface

11 – Alternative Mooring Technology
1. Snap-back
   • Complex
   • No safe area

2. Fit-for-purpose ropes
   • HMSF vs others
   • Purchasing
   • Monitor usage

3. Human Factors (HCD)
   • Design
   • Operations & Maintenance

Equipment, ropes, tails and layout should be designed, operated and maintained as an integrated mooring system.
Mooring Equipment Guidelines

Mooring equipment guidelines is an industry guideline for the safe mooring of tankers and gas carriers at terminals. These guidelines provide extensive guidance for safe mooring from both a ship and terminal perspective. This publication also provides the reader guidance for human centred designs resulting in safer mooring arrangements.
New Terminology

During the revision of MEG it was clear there is confusion in the shipping industry with the term Minimum Breaking Load (MBL) and other terminology relating to line strength.

Further, there was no industry guidance on condition based monitoring of mooring lines and tails. Since nearly all mooring injuries are a result of mooring line failures, OCIMF has strived to provide guidance and clarity on the condition monitoring of mooring lines. Below is a list of some new terms that will be introduced in MEG4. We also encourage you to visit the Clarifications section for further information.

**Minimum Breaking Load Ship Design – MBL SD**

MBL SD is the minimum breaking load of new, dry, mooring lines for which a Ship’s mooring system is designed, in order to meet OCIMF Standard Environmental Criteria restraint requirements. The MBL SD is the core parameter against which all the other components of a Ship’s mooring system are sized and designed, with defined tolerances.

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**Line Design Break Force – LDBF**

LDBF is the minimum force that a new, dry, spliced, mooring line will break at, when tested according to Appendix D of MEG 4. This is for all cordage (synthetic) materials except Nylon which is tested wet and spliced. When selecting lines, the LDBF of a line shall be 100%-105% of the MBL SD. LDBF replaces the terms “MBL of the line” or “rope MBL”, currently used in MEG 3.

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**Working Load Limit – WLL**

WLL is the maximum load that a mooring line should be subjected to in operational service, calculated from the MEG 4 Standard Environmental Restraint criteria. The WLL of mooring lines should be used as user operating limiting values, not to be exceeded.

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**Line Management Plan – LMP**

LMP is used to manage the operation and retirement of mooring lines and tails. The LMP also documents the requirements, assumptions and evaluation methods used in determining the line retirement criteria. The LMP is specific to an operator, Ship type, and trade route; however, MEG4 gives general guidance on establishing a LMP.
Related Publications

This section provides links to OCIMF and other industry guidance they may be of benefit with respect to mooring design and operations.
MEG Information Videos

Click the link below to view some of the key differences within this revision of MEG and other videos of interest.

View Videos
ZARGA Mooring Accident
LESSONS LEARNED

Tony Wynne – Technical Adviser (Nautical)
ZARGA – Mooring accident

- Occurred on 2 March 2015 at Milford Haven
- An ultra-high modulus polyethylene (HMSF) fiber line fitted to a 22m polyethylene tail failed while being tensioned to warp the vessel along the berth
- The Third Officer was seriously injured when struck by the failed line
- Joint investigation by the United Kingdom (UK) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI)
- Report available on the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) website
Failure of HMSF fibre mooring line

- Loss of strength over time due to kink bands created by axial compression
  - Minimum breaking load of the line was 137 tons, failed at 24 tons

- Service related causes of axial compression include: twisting of the line, bending around improperly sized deck fittings, and cyclic loading.

- Jacketed core prevented detection of damaged fibers

- Snap back underestimated
Incorrect size of deck fittings

- Manufacturer’s guidance stated the ratio of the diameter of the deck fittings to the diameter of the mooring line (D/d) was critical.

- Minimum recommended D/d of 12:1 for lines on board ZARGA:
  - Pedestal roller D/d = 10.22
  - Roller fairlead D/d = 9.1

- Factors related to mooring lines not taken into account when fittings were selected by the builder.
Snap Back – destructive testing
Snap Back Zone diagrams revision

Original

Revised
Some of the lessons learned

- The potential for snap back due to the use of polyethylene tails was underestimated.
- The arrangement of the mooring deck meant that the entire foredeck area and portions of the main deck adjacent to the cargo dome were a snap back zone.
- The line manufacturer’s guidance regarding minimum D/d ratio was not taken into account during the selection of deck fittings during new construction.
- The potential for significant reductions in line strength due to axial compression was recognized by the line manufacturer.
- The jacketed core construction rendered ship management’s line inspection procedures ineffective.
Throughout the marine safety investigation, there was good coordination between the investigating States, ship management, the line manufacturer, and the OCIMF.

This coordination has crossed over to participation in the ongoing work being done at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) related to mooring deck issues.

Focus has included:
- Addressing seafarer safety when designing the layout of mooring decks.
- Ensuring mooring lines are considered, starting with the design phase, as part of a vessel’s mooring system.
Mooring Equipment Guidelines (MEG) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

Rob Drysdale – Director
1. **Snap-back**
   - Complex
   - No safe area

2. **Fit-for-purpose ropes**
   - HMSF vs others
   - Purchasing
   - Monitor usage

3. **Human Factors (HCD)**
   - Design
   - Operations & Maintenance

---

**Equipment, ropes, tails and layout should be designed, operated and maintained as an integrated mooring system**
Industry Team work:

Engagement with MAIB  IACS  Ship Owners / Operators

Ports and Terminals  Mooring Line Manufacturers
Making a Regulation

IMO Goal Based Standards

Regulation → Functional Objectives → Achievement of Functional Objectives

Regulation 3-8

Towing and mooring equipment

1. This regulation applies to ships constructed on or after 1 January 2007, but does not apply to emergency towing arrangements provided in accordance with regulation 3-4.

2. Ships shall be provided with arrangements, equipment and fittings of sufficient safe working load to enable the safe conduct of all towing and mooring operations associated with the normal operation of the ship.

3. Arrangements, equipment and fittings provided in accordance with paragraph 2 shall meet the appropriate requirements of the Administration or an organization recognized by the Administration under regulation 1/6.†

4. Each fitting or item of equipment provided under this regulation shall be clearly marked with any restrictions associated with its safe operation, taking into account the strength of its attachment to the ship’s structure.
Known Mooring Incidents

IMO:

MSC 95/19/13 – Japan had more than 90 accidents in five years with two fatalities.

SDC 4/INF.3 – ICHCA International Ltd. (ICHCA), 42 incidents, 25 line failures, 20+ loss of life; over 22 years.
**Known Mooring Incidents**

**MAIB:**

Between 2007 and 2016:
- 37 mooring line failures or snapbacks resulting in three fatalities and 23 injuries.

**EMSA:**

Between 2007 and 2016:
- 213 incidents with recorded ship operations that include "berthing". These resulted in 4 fatalities and 96 injuries.

*Source: MAIB January 2018*
DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO SOLAS REGULATION II-1/3-8

The existing regulation 3-8 is replaced with the following:

"Towing and mooring equipment"

7 For ships of 3,000 gross tonnage and above the design of the mooring arrangement and the selection of appropriate mooring equipment including lines shall be based on guidelines developed by the Organization**, applying a human-centred design approach.

8 Ships of less than 3,000 gross tonnage shall comply with the requirement in paragraph 7 above as far as reasonably practicable, or with applicable national standards of the Administration which provide an equivalent level of safety.

9 For all ships, mooring equipment including lines shall be inspected and maintained in suitable condition for their intended purposes***.
Draft IMO Guidelines

I. Guidelines for Mooring Design – NEW

GUIDELINES ON THE DESIGN OF MOORING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE SELECTION OF APPROPRIATE MOORING EQUIPMENT AND FITTINGS FOR SAFE MOORING

II. Guidelines for Selection, Inspection, and Retirement of Lines – NEW

GUIDELINES FOR INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF MOORING EQUIPMENT INCLUDING LINES
4 Functional objectives

In order to achieve the goals for the correct equipment selection and mooring arrangement design safety objectives set out in paragraph […] the following functional objectives should be applied. Ships shall be provided with mooring equipment and fittings, according to ship types:

.1 designed with systems to provide mooring personnel with the loads on the mooring lines during mooring operations and while the ship is moored to verify that the limitations of the lines are not exceeded;

.2 arranged to minimize obstructed access to and operation of the mooring equipment;

.3 arranged to minimize obstructed access to working space, and minimize obstructed view of the mooring area;

.4 arranged to minimize the need for complex mooring line configurations during the normal operation of the ship;

.5 selected and arranged to minimize the need for manual handling of mooring lines under load; and

.6 selected and arranged to minimize the exposure of personnel involved in mooring operations to the dynamic loads of mooring lines.
Knowing the Limits
IMO & OCIMF

SDC 6 2019 → MSC 101 2019 → SOLAS [2024]?

OCIMF

Ship Inspection Report (SIRE) Programme
It’s a Journey…

Safe Mooring

IMO
- DRAFT Language
  1. Lines in SOLAS
  2. HCD
  3. Line tension monitoring

MEG
- Snap-back is complex
- Fit for purpose lines
- Human Factors (HCD)

You
- What are key items to send your crew home safely?
  1. Line Tension Monitoring?
  2. HCD Mooring?
  3. Condition Monitor Lines?

1. Snap-back is complex
2. Fit for purpose lines
3. Human Factors (HCD)

What are key items to send your crew home safely?
1. Line Tension Monitoring?
2. HCD Mooring?
3. Condition Monitor Lines?
Questions ?
Coffee
OCIMF

A Voice for Safety
OCIMF Programmes

Tony Wynne – Technical Adviser (Nautical)
2017 SIRE Programme and Performance
• A updated VIQ is in development to help focus the inspection programme, expected to be released in Q3 2018

• The report structure is expected to change from 13 chapters to 12 chapters.
  – Old Chapter 10 Communications is now combined with New Chapter 4 Navigations and Communications
  – Old Chapter 7 Structural Condition is renamed Chapter 7 Maritime Security

• New questions relating to industry developments are to be expected concerning, Ballast Water Management, Cyber Security, LNG bunkering, Mooring, etc.

• A reduction of about 75 questions can be anticipated with the removal of some repetitive questions and the addition of more focused questions and guidance principally in chapters:
  – 5 Safety Management
  – 6 Pollution Prevention
  – 8 Cargo and Ballast Systems
  – Chapter 9 will change to comply with new guidance developed from the re-issue of our MEG publication.

• The Officer’s Matrix is again in the process of being aligned with other industry participants for the sake of good order
The Audited Inspection process was changed in September 2016.

Every Audited Inspection will result in a SIRE report being produced.

In the event of an inspector failing an Audited Inspection, the Auditing Inspector will take over responsibilities to complete and submit the report on behalf of the OCIMF Member that commissioned the inspection.

OCIMF is hopeful that that this new process will relieve the concerns held by some of the vessel operators and encourage them to facilitate Audited Inspections on their vessels. Thereby expediting the process of inspector performance evaluation and the learning process that it encompasses.
Data Mining and Webservices

• OCIMF members have been able to use the Data Mining function within the SIRE database for about 4 years.

• This tool has proven useful and in 2017 Datamining was extended to Technical Vessel Operators to allow them to compare their fleet performance against the entire SIRE database.

• The function has also been extended to provide the ability to compare vessel owner associations to the SIRE database, if those members and the vessel owner associations have registered.
  – Currently only INTERTANKO has registered

• Also in 2017 Webservices have been extended to Technical Vessel Operators allowing them to take their reports in data format rather than as a PDF document.
The table below shows a comparison of the numbers and types of the participants registered in the SIRE Programme in 2017 and 2016:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCIMF Membership</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member Companies, all programmes</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>109</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIRE Programme Participants</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
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<tr>
<td>SIRE Submitting Members</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
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<td>SIRE Recipient Members (including PSC)</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>316</td>
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<td>SIRE Technical Vessel Operators</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2253</td>
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<tr>
<th>Accredited SIRE Inspectors</th>
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<tr>
<td>Category 1</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>501</td>
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<td>Category 2</td>
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<td>Category 3</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>121</td>
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<td>SIRE Programme Key Statistics</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanker</td>
<td>Barge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinct vessels inspected in 12 months</td>
<td>8,604</td>
<td>6,735</td>
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<td>VPQs/BPQs downloads</td>
<td>125,847</td>
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<td>Inspection reports published</td>
<td>21,101</td>
<td>8,215</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ratio of inspection reports to vessels</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1.22</td>
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<td>Inspection report downloads by OCIMF Members</td>
<td>121,249</td>
<td>22,233</td>
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<td>Inspection report downloads Recipient Members</td>
<td>30,383</td>
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<td>PSC Inspection report downloads</td>
<td>1,018</td>
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<td>TOTAL Inspection report downloads</td>
<td>141,441</td>
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<td>Combined total of ALL report downloads</td>
<td>165,486</td>
<td>190,165</td>
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## SIRE Report Submissions

### Number of SIRE Tanker and Barge Reports Submitted Per Month

**Jan 2008 to Jan 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Tanker Reports</th>
<th>Barge Reports</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 08</td>
<td>18505</td>
<td>4993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 08</td>
<td>18253</td>
<td>5241</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 08</td>
<td>19195</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Jul 09</td>
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<td>7751</td>
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<td>Oct 09</td>
<td>21108</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 10</td>
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### Average Annual Increase

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<td>Tanker</td>
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<td>20022</td>
<td>21108</td>
<td>22010</td>
<td><strong>+2.38%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Barge</td>
<td>4993</td>
<td>5241</td>
<td>5278</td>
<td>5961</td>
<td>6762</td>
<td>7241</td>
<td>7751</td>
<td>8244</td>
<td>8375</td>
<td><strong>+6.88%</strong></td>
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## Number of SIRE Tanker and Barge Reports Downloaded Per Month
### Jan 2008 to Jan 2018

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<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>158046</td>
<td>32119</td>
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### Average Annual Increase
- **Tanker Reports**: +6.61%
- **Barge Reports**: +19.86%
OCIMF members are now placing greater emphasis on barge safety.

The current Terms Of Reference for the regional workgroups have been observed by members to be too narrow by only covering the SIRE system as it applies to barges.

A new Global Inland and Coastal Barging Focus Group has been created within OCIMF to more closely focus on overall barge safety issues.

In the coming future the existing regional group Terms Of Reference will be expanded to cover safety issues.

OCIMF will add a Barging Technical Advisor to the Secretariat staff to attend all regional barge groups and help coordinate industry best practice.
Currently there are three regional barge groups that will be coordinated by the Barge Technical Advisor:

- North America
- South and Central America
- Europe

There are currently 4 different BIQs and BPQs
- The three listed above plus an International variant.
- Further variants may be developed to support member needs.

An internal OCIMF Barge strategy is being developed for areas East of the Arabian Gulf. This may result in more regional groups being established to enhance industry safety in other regions.
The International Safety Management (ISM) code came into effect 1\textsuperscript{st} July 1998 and it stated that:

“A fundamental principle of the ISM Code is that each ship operator is individual and that their SMS should be developed to fit their individual organisation.”

OCIMF introduced Tanker Management and Self Assessment to aid the industry in meeting this expectation and has redeveloped the publication to continue the drive for operational safety.

**TMSA** – First edition published 2004
   To help v/l operators assess, measure and improve their management systems.

   To update and build on operators experience and feedback from the industry. Expanded to include tank barge operators coastal and inland barges.
Tanker Management and Self Assessment

TMSA3 – Third edition published 10th April 2017

This update was made to improve the consistency and clarity of earlier question sets. It also sought to make the self assessment easier to carry out and promote continuous improvement.

- Reflects changes in legislation and best practice –
- Seeks to encourage a more unified interpretation of the KPIs by providing expanded best practice guidance to complement the new established KPIs.
- Improves the universal application of TMSA to all vessel and company types. TMSA3 can be applied across the industry from small barge companies to the largest tanker fleets.

Continuous improvement
- ............ an integral requirement of TMSA.
TMSA 3 - Key changes

- Expanded best practice guidance to complement the established KPIs.
- Removed ambiguity and duplication of some questions.
- Streamlined and merged assessment elements to improve consistency and make conducting the self assessment easier.
- Expanded content was added in Element 6 and 6A for:
  • Cargo,
  • Ballast,
  • Tank Cleaning,
  • Bunkering
  • Mooring and Anchoring Operations
- Added Element 13 – Maritime Security. (NEW)
- Updated for New industry legislative requirements

The TMSA programme will continue to evolve with time.

New KPIs may be added and best practice guidance updated in future editions.
TMSA3 Migration: From 9th April 2018 all TMSA reports created or published within SIRE must be in the TMSA3 format.

898 out of the 1040 (86.35%) Vessel Operators subscribed to TMSA in 2017 or 2018 have either a Published a TMSA3 report or are in the process of preparing a TMSA3 for publication.

Published reports as of Q1 2018:

- Operators with a published TMSA3: 728 (70% of registered operators)
- Operators with a published TMSA2: 221 (21.25% of registered operators), 112 of which have a TMSA3 in draft
- Operators with no published TMSA report: 91 (8.75% of registered operators), 58 of which have a TMSA3 in draft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TMSA Key Statistics</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TMSA published (2 or 3)</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>1,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMSA downloaded</td>
<td>37,228</td>
<td>38,223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Offshore Vessel Inspection Database (OVID) was created in response to a request from OCIMF members to provide a database of offshore vessel inspections broadly following the SIRE format.

In 2010 OCIMF initiated the OVID programme to provide a robust web-based inspection tool and report database mirroring the SIRE programme.

The OVID inspection protocol allows offshore projects and marine assurance teams to assess the safety and environmental performance of vessels and operators in a uniform and effective manner.

Inspections covering the classed and operational capabilities of vessels are carried out by OCIMF accredited inspectors on behalf of the commissioning OCIMF member companies.
• OVID Programme Recipient status was created in January 2017 as an effort to streamline the industry’s offshore vessel safety inspections

• Eligibility is extended to companies that charter offshore vessels in support of their operations or have offshore vessels operating at their facilities. Such companies eligibility is evaluated based on their shared concerns for marine safety and pollution prevention being aligned to OCIMF’s mission

• Some of these Programme Recipients may not be involved in the hydrocarbon industry and may or may not be DoC holders of an offshore vessel

• All of these Programme Recipients have a need for marine assurance but were unable to utilize the OVID programme under previous programme guidance

• These Programme Recipients are required to obtain approval from a Technical Vessel Operator through the OVID system, prior to receiving access to any vessel’s OVID Report
Some types of eligible companies are:

- Oil companies that are not currently OCIMF members.
- Offshore project management, engineering, procurement and construction companies.
- Wind farm operators.
- Offshore terminal / installation operators.
- Logistics/supply base operators.
- Marine drilling contractors.
- Marine geophysical contractors.
- Owners of vessels who also provide wider technical services to the offshore industry and charter in vessel / units / equipment to provide services to OCIMF members.
- Government agencies.
• OCIMF members operating in the offshore industry segment sought a more efficient way for vessel operators to request an OVID inspection.

• In January 2017 an OVIR portal was created as part of the OVID programme. From this portal Technical Vessel Operator’s may submit a request for an inspection of their vessel / equipment into a secure website. This request can be viewed by all OCIMF members participating in OVID who may chose to commission an inspection.

• The goal is for vessel operators to begin tracking the status of their vessel’s OVID and self request an annual OVID inspection to be available for all member and recipient companies in a routine manner.

• In turn, this readily available safety inspection will help reduce the time spent evaluating offshore vessels before proceeding to the internal on-hire processes of OCIMF OVID Members and OVID Programme Recipients.
The table below shows a comparison of the numbers and types of the participants registered in the OVID Programme in 2017 and 2016:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCIMF Membership</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member Companies, all programmes</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVID Programme Participants</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OVID Submitting Members</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVID Recipient Members (including PSC)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVID Technical Vessel Operators</td>
<td>1643</td>
<td>1834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accredited OVID Inspectors</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVID Programme Key Statistics</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinct vessels inspected in 12 months</td>
<td>2,557</td>
<td>2,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPQs/BPQs downloads</td>
<td>13,501</td>
<td>34,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection reports published</td>
<td>2,644</td>
<td>2,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of inspection reports to vessels</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCIMF Members Inspection report downloads by</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>1,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Members Inspection report downloads * Became available in 2017</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC Inspection report downloads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Inspection report downloads</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>1,506</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OVID Report Downloads

OVID Reports Downloads
Mar 2010 to Jan 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Report Downloads</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1322</td>
<td>1448</td>
<td>1518</td>
<td>1374</td>
<td>1508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• The OVMSA concept is based on the success of the TMSA methodology.

• OVMSA helps Technical Vessel Operators prioritise the development and improvement of their own Safety Management System, while providing insight into industry performance indicators that may be used to drive an internal continuous improvement process.

• In addition to functioning as a tool for the operator, OCIMF member companies can use the OVMSA system to develop an overview of overall operator performance in conjunction with OVID inspections.

• Many OVIQ questions answered in the course of an OVID inspection were designed to be matched against OVMSA by the OCIMF member company Marine Assurance teams.
OVMSA Statistics

- **448** published OVMSAs are more than 1 year old
- **327** published OVMSAs are more than 2 years old
- **194** published OVMSAs are more than 3 years old

**1033** Operators using OVMSA (have a draft or published document) out of **1978** registered operators: **52.22%**

**773** Operators with published OVMSAs: **39.08%**
Importance of vessel inspection and vetting

Akihito Otake - Idemitsu Tanker Co Ltd
Importance of Tanker Inspection and Vetting
14 June 2018
1. Introduction

SIRE set in 1993

Inspection → Inspection Report → Ship Operator

Vetting

A cop, B Inc, C com, D cop, E Inc

OCIMF 109 members
1. Introduction

Vetting Activity

Tanker Quality

Ship Operator

Berth Master Inspector

Commercial Arm

Future

Accident Zero

P

A

D

C

Vetting
2. Decrease of serious incidents

- Number of large oil spills >700 tones
- 10 years average

@Copy Right ITOPF
3. Voice of Commercial Arm - 1

Trader: “Cargo holder has nothing to do”

CFR
- Any risks?

Machinery trouble

Ship Owner

Cargo Holder

My memorandum

Not only ship owner is liable in safety

Buyer: “Procurement is the 1st priority”

Supply security is to make balance with safety
3. Voice of Commercial Arm-3

Trader: “Can you omit or skip vetting?”

- calling on a 3rd party terminal
- got clearance by Oil Majors

Vetting is the 1st step to start business
3. Voice of Commercial Arm-4

Accountant: “Is vetting worth the cost?”

Safety is most cost-effective
4. Vetting Activity Updates-1

Learning from the history
Safety Education Center in Airline Industry

Highly recommended for everyone
4. Vetting Activity updates-2

In-house education

- Learning accident
- Significance of vetting

My memorandum

Changing mind: Safety is most cost-effective
5. Summary

5.1 Tanker Vetting is a system whereby oil companies evaluate, maintain and improve the quality of tankers, aiming at Zero accident (Best practice).

5.2 As a result of reflecting the major accident of the ship and taking countermeasures, major accidents of tankers have decreased.

5.3 However, the young generation does not know the big accident as a real experience.

5.4 It is important to make opportunities to learn from history and think deeply about the significance of Vetting.
5. Summary

➢ Thank you for listening and patience
OCIMF

A Voice for Safety
Ship Operator views of Vetting and SIRE

Capt. Richard D’Souza - Teekay Marine (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
VETTING – OPERATOR’S PERSPECTIVE
OCIMF Regional Forum, Tokyo
Agenda

• Introduction to Teekay
• History in Vetting
• Leveraging the SIRE program
• SIRE – An opportunity
• Looking Ahead
Teekay Marine Singapore
Teekay Tankers – Owned and Operated Fleet

Suezmax, 29 55%

Aframax, 17, 32%

LR2, 7, 13%
THE WORLD’S LEADING TANKER BRAND

TOGETHER We will be the best

- Operate the best ships in the industry
- Provide our customers with the best service in the market
- Be our investors’ best choice in the sector
- Develop the best opportunities to grow and diversify

Our Ships are our Product
Customer is King
Financial Strength
Opportunity Development

Acting with an ownership mindset and live by our values

Safety & Sustainability | Passion | Integrity | Reliability | Innovation | Teamwork
Global and Diverse Customer Network

- Customer relationships spanning 45 years based on our reputation for reliability and operational excellence
- Provides access to diverse cargo streams and agility to respond to changing market dynamics
Vetting - History
Vetting
To avoid this...
And to avoid this...
Is it working?

Oil Spills (≥700 T) 1970-2017

- 1970-79: 24.5 spills per year on average
- 1980-89: 9.4 spills per year on average
- 1990-99: 7.7 spills per year on average
- 2000-09: 3.2 spills per year on average
- 2010-17: 1.8 spills per year on average
Is it working?
TK - Vetting and Port State Control

2017 SIRE Target: <1.5

2017 PSC Target: 0.4

* Intertanko Figures from OCIMF Data Mining
Leveraging the SIRE Program
Leveraging the SIRE program

Safer Ships

Enhanced Sharing

Value Addition

Unified Approach
Vetting – An Opportunity
Vetting – Oil Major individual requirements

- Scheduling Limitations
- Increased Inspections
- Impact on Human Element
Vetting – Operational Restrictions

- Trading pattern
- Offshore ports
- Last minute cancellations
- Boarding restrictions
- Out of SIRE window
SIRE – Conduct of Inspection

- Individual KPI
- Differing interpretation of VIQ question
- Lack of pragmatism
- Oil Major Inspectors v/s Contracted inspection parties
Impact on Vessel Clearance

- VIQ Number v/s Risk
- VIQ Observation v/s Risk
- Service providers contracted by Oil Majors
- Risk of Observation and its effect on vessel clearance
- Blanket rejections
- Imposed ‘sanctions’
Vetting – Looking Ahead
Vetting – Looking Ahead

- Direct bookings into OCIMF
- Oil major inspector (inhouse)
- Linking TMSA to SIRE
- Uniformity in Officer matrix requirement
- Uniformity in risk profile
- Focus on Terminal feedback
Together, we will operate the best ships in the industry.
Questions ?
Lunch
A Voice for Safety
Piracy and Security

The OCIMF view of Current Maritime Security Threats

Phillip Pascoe – General Counsel
Security Issues

➢ **Introduction** –

➢ OCIMF Adviser / MSSC / MNLO / Cyber Security WG

- Cyber Security
- Gulf of Guinea
- South East Asia
- Northern Indian Ocean / Gulf of Aden / Bab al Mandeb
- Hull Vulnerability Study
- BMP5 / Global Piracy Document
Cyber Security

OCIMF Cyber Security Committee

• Key Themes
  • Cyber Assessment – better understanding of networks and IT components.
  • Understanding & Awareness – culture & education campaign.
  • Process to improve the standards of third party vendors.

• Industry Guidance
  • “The Guidelines on Cyber Security onboard Ship”
  • “Be Cyber Aware at Sea – Maritime Cyber Security” (Video available online)
  • “Cyber Security – Smart safe shipping” (Steamship Mutual DVD)

• Cyber Incident Sharing
• TMSA 3 / Review of SIRE VIQ
Gulf of Guinea

Ship Reporting

- MTISC-GoG –
  - OCIMF lead Pilot project end June 2016
- MDAT-GoG –
  - Joint UK /FR initiative commenced June 2016

Key Initiatives

- Yaoundé Code of Conduct
  - Adopted 2013 by 25 West & Central African States
- G7+ “Friends of the Gulf of Guinea” FOG
Northern Indian Ocean / Gulf of Aden / Bab el Mandeb

Current key issues

• EUNAVFOR – Op Atalanta

• Industry designated High Risk Area
  • BMP4 – Sept 2011
  • HRA Review and amendment 2015
  • IMO MSC99 – No change to the HRA

• Other Maritime Security Threats to Shipping
  • New threats to Merchant shipping related to the Yemen conflict
  • CMF - Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC)
MSTC:

The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)
The BAM TSS and the TSS West of the Hanish Islands
A two-way route directly connecting the IRTC and the BAM TSS
Story Board: MV INCE INEBOLU – 10 May 2018

- Estimated point of explosion
- Likely angle of impact
- Grain spill from cargo tank
- Perforation in deck from explosion below
- Distortion to hand rails away from explosion area below
- Hatch cover likely blown off. Lack of nuts around it suggests not removed manually.
Hull Vulnerability Study

• **Aim:** To study the vulnerability of a tanker to a range of credible threats, including a large waterborne IED, representative anti-ship missile and two anti-tank missile variants. The analysis considered damage to the hull and internal bulkheads, the vulnerability of critical systems and personnel survival.

**Output:**
- Short term, measures that can be deployed easily and immediately on operational ships.
- Medium term, vulnerability reduction measures that can be introduced into in-service ships as a part of re-fit or retro-fit procedures.
- Long term, the adoption of survivability enhancement practices in the design of future ships.

**Examples:**
- **Short term measures:**
  - Alternative safe muster points.
  - Ballistic protection/body armour for crew.
  - Placement of life rafts.
- **Medium term:**
  - Structural armouring of critical locations
  - Blast suppression systems (armour plated hatches).
- **Long term:**
  - Duplication of critical systems.
  - Side Protection systems on hull.

The detonation of 300kg of TNT 1m from the hull will result in a large hull breach of around 9m in diameter.
Industry Guidance

• History
  • BMP3 - June 2010
  • BMP4 – Sept 2011
    • HRA Amendments 2015

• BMP 5
• Global Counter Piracy Document
• Industry Maritime Security website
• Due to be launched 28th June 2018
A Voice for Safety
Incident – Machinery Breakdown

Rahul Baberwal - AMPOL
Content

- Introduction
- Machinery Breakdown Summary

Year 2017
YTD 2018

- Analysis & Take-Away(s)
- Measures Taken / Going Forward……..
- Q&A
INTRODUCTION

• Ampol is a wholly owned subsidiary of Caltex Australia, listed on the Australia Stock Exchange (ASX)

• Ampol is responsible for entire Marine Assurance activities for Caltex Australia Group

• Ampol plays a critical role in Caltex Australia’s integrated supply chain

• Today we will share analysis & leanings from the Machinery Breakdown incidents recorded on our chartered tonnage over last 17 months (Year 2017 & YTD 2018)
SUMMARY – Year 2017

• Main Propulsion System
  - ME Fuel Injector Leakage
  - ME Cylinder Head Jacket Crack
  - Fuel Oil Back Wash Filter Failure
  - Automation: Alpha Lube Oil Feedback Signal Faulty
  - ME Exhaust Valve Failure

• Cargo System / Cargo Equipment(s)
  - Cargo Pump Failure during Discharging Operation
  - Inert Gas System Failure
  - Gas Detection System Failure

• Navigational Equipment(s)
  - Radar Failure
  - Steering Gear Failure

• Diesel Generator / Auxiliary Engine
  - Loss of Power and steering while departing from Port

• Deck Machinery / Equipment(s)
  - Nil
SUMMARY - YTD 2018

• **Main Engine**
  - Exhaust valve Failure
  - Cylinder Head Jacket Crack
  - Automation: incorrect signal received from Cylinder to CCU
  - Reversing Mechanism failure
  - Exhaust Gas Boiler: Soot Blowing valves stuck in open Position

• **Navigational Equipment(s)**
  - ECDIS Failure
  - Navtex Failure

• **Cargo System / Cargo Equipment(s)**
  - Oil Leakage from hydraulic pilot line for Cargo Pump
  - Hydraulic oil leak from a hose coupling on the actuator for Slop Pump
  - Failure of Auxiliary Boiler automation system
  - **Diesel Generator / Auxiliary Engine**
    - Nil

• **Deck Machinery / Equipment(s)**
  - Malfunction of Winch Hydraulic System
  - Parting of Mooring Ropes
## MACHINERY BREAKDOWN - Year 2017 Vs YTD 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Year 2017</th>
<th>YTD 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Propulsion System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Equipments / Cargo System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Generator / Aux Engine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deck Machinery / Equipments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ON-BOARD EQUIPMENT / SYSTEMS**
MACHINERY BREAKDOWN – “AGE” OF THE VESSEL

- Year 2017
- YTD 2018

- <5 Years
- 5 Years to <8 Years
- 8 Years to <10 Years
- >10 Years

AGE OF VESSEL
ANALYSIS & TAKE-AWAY(s)

TREND ANALYSIS:

• *Root Cause / Direct Cause*: did not reveal any non-compliance with Maintenance requirements (PMS)

• *Substantial increase* in the number of Machinery Breakdown

• *Show Stopper*: Main Propulsion System

• *Mid Age Crisis*: Majority cases reported on vessel(s) between 8 - 10 Years

• *Others*: Vessel Type, Trade Pattern and/ or Technical Operators

TAKE-AWAY(s):

• Planned Maintenance System (PMS)

• Critical Age Span between 8-10 Years

• Repetition of Similar Incident on Same Vessel

• Spares or Inventory Management

• Incident Management & Non Compliance with Reporting and Communication requirements post Incident

**NOTE**: Poor Incident Management & non-compliance with reporting requirements / Inadequate communication may lead to temporary hold on entire fleet.
Steps Taken / Going Forward

• **Safety Forum**
  - Safety Forum is conducted on biannual basis with Technical Operators
  - Brain Storming session with Technical Operator(s) on Machinery Breakdown
  - Importance of Reporting & Communication
  - Life between 2\textsuperscript{nd} intermediate Survey to 2\textsuperscript{nd} Renewal Survey

• **TMSA Review**
  
  *Enhanced Focus on:*
  - Element 4: Implementation and effectiveness
  - Element 11: Emergency Preparedness capabilities

• **Vessel Clearance Process**
  
  *Following considered as High Risk observations:*
  - Repetition of Machinery Breakdown(s)
  - PMS Overdue Jobs
  - Inadequate Spare Management System

• **OCIMF Incident Repository**
CONCLUSION

General trend in increase of Machinery Breakdown Incidents

and..........

“We all collectively need to take responsibility to improve the SAFETY & operational RELIABILITY of vessel’s at sea”
OCIMF

A Voice for Safety
Incident - Damage to Fishing nets in Japanese waters

Capt Alok Kumar - Tanker Group - MMS Co. Ltd.
Damage to Fishing net in Japanese waters

Case Study & Information sharing

OCIMF
ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL MARINE Forum
Tokyo – 14 June 2018

Capt. Alok Kumar
MMS Co., Ltd.
Laden VLCC drawing 20.10 M Draft in Japanese waters on 15 Jan 2018

As per information received from the terminal, the vessel had allegedly damaged fishing nets

At this time, Bay Pilot was on board and vessel was approaching harbor pilot station for berthing
• Vessel did not see any movement of marker buoys after passing over the fishing nets, therefore it was considered that there has been no damage to the nets and hence this incident was not reported to the terminal and local authorities neither by vessel nor by the bay pilot.

• It was cloudy with NW winds of BF 2 or 3 and good visibility, no significant tidal currents with the daybreak being at 0717 hours.
INCIDENT — BRIEF DETAILS

- 0620 LT: Bay POB
- 0624 LT: Master/pilot exchange done
- 0645 LT: Increased gradually to full ahead
- 0720 LT: About 12.5 miles from terminal, speed about 12kts, vessel sighted many fishing boats on the course line.
- Discussed the situation and alternatives with pilot.
- Decided to slow down engine and alter course to port side, towards the coast to keep clear of the fishing boats.
0750 LT: Vessel noticed 2 fishing boats fine on the stbd bow about 2 miles away.

Bay Pilot informed vessel that five tugs are on the way.

Pilot informed that he has asked the tugs to ensure that the fishing boats keep away from the vessel’s planned passage.

Ships whistle was blown twice by Master as warning for the fishing boats to keep clear.
INCIDENT — BRIEF DETAILS

• 0810 LT: Vessel noted several yellow markers fine on the stbd bow indicating possibility of net on the passage but they could not see the marker on the port side indicating end of the net.

• Bay pilot informed nets are very deep so vessel can safely pass over without damaging it.

• Since it was not safe to alter more to port side within the distance & time available, Master decided to pass over the net with Engines stopped.

• Vessel passed the markers and noticed they did not move indicating vessel may not have touched the net. Same was confirmed to the Master by the Pilot as well.

• Before and after the passing over the net, there were no warning signals from any of the fishing boats such as by waving flags, loud speaker, VHF Radio or flashing lights, and no boats chased the vessel to notify the accident.
INCIDENT — BRIEF DETAILS

- 0820 LT: Harbour pilot on board followed by Master/pilot exchange.
- 0824-0840LT: Five (5) Tugs made fast
- 1050 LT: All fast
INCIDENT — BRIEF DETAILS

ECDIS Display

Of planned passage & actual passage showing the substantial deviation taken to avoid heavy fishing traffic.
INCIDENT – ECDIS SCREEN
Berthing procedure for Sea Berth

**Note**
- DOW reports Ship's Sp'd, position, and distance from berth to Master frequently.
- Fix ship's position every 5 minutes.
- In case of intention of dangerous situation, Master must confirm the Pilot about his intention.
- If the dangerous situation is not be changed, Master must take the ship's command.

**Berthing Speed**

- Horizontal distance from berth fender
  - 200m ⇒ 15cm/sec or less
  - 100m ⇒ 20cm/sec or less
  - 30m ⇒ 5cm/sec or less
- Fender Touch ⇒ less than 5cm/sec

*Reduce to the berthing speed as much as possible*

**Abort line**

- Abort line is set 1 mile from the berth, thence
  - H.M less than 235" or more than 250"
  - Sp'd over 3 kt'

The Master will decide to suspend berthing and return to the point where far from the POB area to approach again.

<Est. 01 Jul. 2015>
Around 1630 LT: MMS received call from Charterers that a few Fishermen had approached the terminal and complained about the vessel damaging their nets.

P&I club was informed and they appointed an ex-Master Mariner Surveyor for the investigation.

The P&I Surveyor held meetings with terminal staff and then with the Fishermen.

He conducted an investigation on the vessel on 18th Jan at next port.
INCIDENT — CONSEQUENCES

- MMS received the preliminary report on 19th Jan with following conclusion

“As the 2 fishing nets were provided with the floats regulated by the Governor, we are unfortunately of the opinion that there would be no settlements unless the Tanker holds the full responsibility”

Estimation:
- Labors: JPY 400,000.-
- Sections: JPY 800,000.-
- Loss of earning: JPY 3,500,000.-
INCIDENT – MAJOR Consequence

Vessel was put on Technical Hold by the terminal and not allowed to call Terminal until Owners carry out Incident Investigation and submit the report to the Terminal for their review and acceptance.
INCIDENT – OTHER FACTS

- MMS had several exchanges with P&I club Surveyor however he maintained his stand and advised further.

“The fisherman requested the Port Management Office to instruct the vessel to avoid the nets by swerving around either north or south ends of the nets, so that I believe that the vessel should have swerved around the fishing boats which were hauling up the north ends of the nets, or stopped the engine to wait for the nets to be completely hauled up. No.18 Rule of the International Prevention of Collision at Sea stipulates to the effect that the vessel has to avoid the fishing boats by altering its course and/or reducing its speed or by stopping.”
MMS requested P&I club surveyor to interview Bay Pilot to which surveyor replied that the interview will not be allowed by the Pilot Association.

MMS then contacted the Pilot association to allow us to talk directly to the Bay Pilot, but Pilot association conveyed that any communication has to be passed though the Association and would be verbal only.

The Pilot’s Association confirmed verbally that the Bay Pilot had prior information with respect to heavy fishing activity and had been asked by the agent to pass south of normal approach route to the extent safely possible.

Reportedly, the Bay Pilot had discussed change of passage plan with the Master due to fishing activity en-route.

Reportedly, the Bay Pilot was also aware that the net was only 11-12m deep, whereas vessel draft is more than 20m.
As per Bridge Team statements - There was no information sharing from Bay pilot to vessel Master regarding possible fishing boat activities.

The agents had not provided any information to the vessel regarding the dense fishing traffic to be expected approaching terminal under bay pilotage.
Terminal put the vessel on technical hold which was lifted only after submission of investigation report with satisfactory preventive actions.

Owners paid ¥ 2,000,000 to the fishermen as settlement and release of the claim.
Thank you
Questions ?
Coffee
A Voice for Safety
OCIMF Secretariat

Tony Wynne – Technical Adviser (Nautical)
New Staff

Chairman –
Mark Ross (Chevron)

Director
– Robert Drysdale (IMT)
New Staff

Deputy Director
– Sam Megwa (BP)

Senior Technical Adviser
– David Wall (Chevron)
New Staff

Engineering Adviser
– Ricardo Martinez (Chevron)

Inspector Training & Accreditation Manager
– Ajay Gour
Released in 2017

Books
• Recommendations for Oil and Chemical Manifolds and Associated Equipment
• Tanker Management and Self Assessment, Third Edition

Information papers
• Northern Sea Route Navigation
• The Guidelines On Cyber Security Onboard Ships
• Linked Ship/Shore Emergency Shutdown Systems for Oil and Chemical Transfers
• Inert Gas Systems The Use Of Inert Gas For The Carriage Of Flammable Oil Cargoes

Due release in 2018

Books
• Mooring Equipment Guidelines, Fourth Edition (MEG 4)
• Cargo Guidelines for F(P)SOs
• Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations
• Construction Specification for Marine Loading Arms
• Effective Mooring

Information papers
• Transfer of Personnel by Crane between Vessels
• Critical Spare Parts
• Industry Expectations for the Provision of Marine Terminal Information Regulations
• Marine Terminals Impacted by Ice or Severe Sub Zero Temperatures
• Navigational Audits and Assessments - A Guide to Best Practice
• Ship Security - Guidelines to Harden Vessels
• Volatile organic compounds (VOC) emissions white paper
• Transiting the Turkish Straits
• Joint INTERTANKO – Recommendations for Effective Sharing of Lessons Learnt from Incidents
• Joint INTERTANKO – Competency Assessment Verification
Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations (GOTO)

GOTO updates and supersedes the following OCIMF publications:

Offshore Loading Safety Guidelines with Special Relevance to Harsh Weather Zones.

Tandem Mooring and Offloading Guidelines for Conventional Tankers at F(P)SO Facilities.

Recommendations for Equipment Employed in the Bow Mooring of Conventional Tankers at Single Point Moorings.
Questions ?
A Voice for Safety